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DOES THE CRIME JUSTIFY THE PUNISHMENT?
AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THE INDIANA UNIVERSITY
PHONE CALL SCANDAL
TJ. Clifton*
I. INTRODUCTION
"We've been hit extremely hard by this, and I hope everybody is
really paying attention to it, and the people making the decisions real-
ize how much of a detriment this is."' That was current Indiana Uni-
versity basketball coach Tom Crean responding to questions about the
possibility that his basketball team will face more punishment in the
wake of the Kelvin Sampson telephone scandal. In October of 2007,
Indiana announced that its basketball coach, Kelvin Sampson, and his
assistants had made over 100 phone calls in violation of NCAA
recruiting rules.2 In the aftermath, Indiana removed the entire coach-
ing staff and only two players remained from the team that played
under Sampson.3
At first, the NCAA charged that the Indiana program had commit-
ted four major NCAA rules violations resulting from the coaching
staff's excessive calls. 4 A few months later, the NCAA shocked Indi-
ana and charged them with a fifth major violation in the form of a
failure to monitor charge.5 While the NCAA claims that the athletic
department failed in its monitoring and supervision of Sampson and
his assistants, the University fired back and claimed that it would "vig-
orously defend" the unjustified charges. 6 Initially, Indiana argued that
the impermissible calls were more an indication on the veracity of
Sampson and his ability to hide the phone calls from the compliance
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, DePaul University College of Law.
1. Michael Marot, Crean Argues Against Additional NCAA Sanctions, USA TODAY, Nov. 6,
2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/2008-10-06-31963533
71_x.htm.3196353371_x.htm.
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3. Michael Marot, IU Blames Former Coaches For Latest NCAA Charge, USA TODAY, Sept.
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department rather than an indictment on the strength of its compli-
ance program.7
While this may seem like a simple "he said, she said" dispute, this
conflict has highlighted the larger issue of whether the NCAA should
hold institutions responsible for the individual acts of the coaches they
hire. While the coach at fault will likely be dismissed and have a new
job in months, these institutions are left with reeling programs and
student-athletes who are punished for the acts of a select few. The
issue becomes a balancing act, weighing the detriment on the current
student-athletes and the program's themselves against the desire to
punish the program and deter others from undertaking similar unethi-
cal acts.
This article will attempt to justify the NCAA's punishment as fair
and legally defensible. First, it will examine in-depth the situation at
Indiana University. Second, it will turn to past infractions punished by
the NCAA in similar situations and look at the different ways the
NCAA handed out the punishment and analyze the fairness of its de-
cisions. Third, it will move outside of the NCAA and look at three
different legal concepts and analyze how fair and effective those doc-
trines would be if applied to the NCAA's punishment of institutions.
Finally, this article will evaluate the fairness of the Infraction Commit-
tee's decision against Indiana in light of its precedent and other legal
doctrines evaluated in the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Leading Up to the Hiring of Sampson
The Indiana University athletic department has had an excellent re-
cord in its compliance with NCAA rules. The University has had no
major violations since 1960 and the men's basketball program has
never been found to have committed a major violation.8 That squeaky
clean image began to change as the 2005-2006 season came to a close.
On March 29th, 2006, Indiana University announced the hiring of a
new men's basketball coach, Kelvin Sampson. 9 Sampson previously
coached at the University of Oklahoma and left amid an NCAA in-
vestigation into a supposed 550 impermissible calls to recruits by
7. Id.
8. Mark Alesia, Indiana Makes Formal Response to NCAA Infraction, USA TODAY, May 13,
2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/bigten/2008-05-13-in-
diana-responseN.htm.
9. Indiana Hires Sampson To Replace Davis, ESPN, Mar. 29, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/
ncblnews/story?id=2389192.
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Sampson and his assistant coaches.' 0 At his introductory news confer-
ence, Sampson stated, "you also have to realize we're human and we
make mistakes, I made a mistake but we've corrected it and moved
forward."" Indiana President, Adam Herbert, was aware of the issues
at Oklahoma and stated that it was the University's number one con-
cern, but that school officials had reviewed the violations and were
satisfied with Sampson's ability to run a clean program.12 Indiana was
confident that it had found its man to return the basketball program
to prominence and fame. Little did it know what type of fame lie
ahead.
B. Sampson's Violations
In October of 2007, Indiana University reported to the NCAA what
it called secondary violations for over 100 impermissible calls by
Sampson and his staff to potential recruits.13 These were the same im-
permissible calls that Sampson and his staff had been making at
Oklahoma. In February of 2008, the NCAA accused the men's basket-
ball program of four major violations stemming from the over 100 im-
permissible calls.14 In the coming months the NCAA would add an
additional charge, this time against Indiana University itself, in the
form of a failure to monitor charge.'5 Shocked and upset with the
charge against the Institution, Indiana President Michael McRobbie
said the school would "vigorously defend" itself.16 While the Univer-
sity would not know its fate until the NCAA made a ruling, Sampson
and his basketball program quickly experienced the fallout from their
actions.
C. Indiana's Reaction to the Scandal
In the aftermath of the alleged impermissible calls, Indiana under-
went a massive house cleaning project within its basketball program.
Sampson's contract was bought out for $750,000 and all of his assist-
ants were let go.17 By December of 2008, Rick Greenspan, the athletic
director, who had hired Sampson, had resigned.' 8 Going into the 2008-
2009 season, only two players remained from the 2007 team, as the
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Marot, supra note 1.
14. Marot, supra note 1.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Marot, supra note 3.
75
76 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
rest had either transferred or been kicked off the team.19 The Univer-
sity eventually completely restructured the compliance office that
failed to monitor Sampson. 20 Marquette University's Tom Crean was
hired to be the new coach of the tarnished program.21 His contract
included a provision giving Indiana permission to fire Crean if either
he or anyone on his staff committed an NCAA violation.22 While
Crean was now in charge of rebuilding the once proud basketball
powerhouse, the University and its legal counsel had to come up with
a defense to minimize the possible penalties from the NCAA.
In Indiana's formal response to the NCAA Infractions Committee,
the school pleaded with the Committee to be gentle. "Since the uni-
versity now has a new coaching staff that was not involved in any way
with these phone calls (or the other allegations) and since this staff
already has to serve the remainder of the self-imposed penalties, the
university continues to believe additional penalties are
unnecessary." 23
In its response, Indiana lays out a four prong defense with the hopes
of diminishing the penalties that the NCAA will hand down. Initially,
the University argues that its compliance system exceeded standard
practices found at universities across the country and that no compli-
ance system no matter how intensive could stop coaches who intend to
cheat.24 In direct response to the failure to monitor charge, the school
claimed this was not in fact a failure to monitor case, but rather an
unethical conduct case on behalf of Sampson and his staff, not the
institution. 25 The University claimed it reviewed 100% of more than
70,000 calls made by the basketball staff and that its system was the
best that technology would allow.2 6 The impermissible calls, which are
cited in the violations, were undetectable because the coaching staff
would falsely report about how many calls they were actually
making.27
The second prong of the University's defense pertained to their self-
imposed penalties. The University felt that the recruiting limitations
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Alesia, supra note 8.
24. Mark Alesia, Indiana To NCAA: Coaches Unethical, Monitoring Not To Blame, USA To-
DAY, Oct. 1, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/bigten/
2008-09-30-indianaN.htm.
25. Id.
26. Marot, supra note 3.
27. Alesia, supra note 24.
[Vol. 6:73
2009] DOES THE CRIME JUSTIFY THE PUNISHMENT?
placed on Crean and his staff and forfeiting one scholarship for the
basketball program were sufficient punishment alone and that no fur-
ther penalties were necessary. 28 On top of their own self-imposed pen-
alties, schools officials felt that the negative publicity on not only the
basketball program but the University itself was damage enough. 29
The school believed that the intense media scrutiny around the coun-
try coupled with the negative public relations of the past year were the
equivalent of a probationary period.30 The final prong of Indiana's
defense looked at the Infractions Committee precedent in a case in-
volving the Chicago State women's basketball program.3' In short, the
NCAA found the school was not guilty of a lack of institutional con-
trol because the school's coach was acting on her own.3 2 The Chicago
State situation is similar to the facts of Indiana's situation and will be
discussed in depth below. In closing, Indiana cited to the Infractions
Committee's own statements that the goal in these cases is to make
the Universities better going forward and not to cripple the team cur-
rently in place at the school. 33 With that, Indiana officials left their
fate up to the NCAA Infractions Committee with the hope of avoid-
ing significant punishment.
D. Ruling of Infractions Committee
On November 25th, 2008 the NCAA released the Infractions Com-
mittee 34 report as Indiana school officials and fans braced for the
worst.3 5 The Committee put the Institution on three years of proba-
tion, but abstained from imposing further penalties on the school for
numerous reasons. 36 The Committee accepted the self-imposed sanc-
28. Michael Marot, Indiana Braces For Possibility of More Penalties, BigTen Network, Sept.
30, 2008, http://admin.bigtennetwork.com/news/article.asp?list-id=22&story-id=3171315&F
PG=45.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. The NCAA Committee on Infractions is a body composed of individuals from NCAA
member institutions which has the authority to determine what findings should be made and
what penalties should be assessed to member institutions. NCAA, Division I Committee on
Infractions, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?key=/ncaa/ncaallegislation+and+governance/commit-
tees/division+ilinfractions/index.html (last visited September 25, 2009) [hereinafter Committee].
35. Division I Committee on Infractions Penalizes Indiana University, NCAA, Nov. 25, 2008,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentlD=41518 [hereinafter Committee punish IU].
36. NCAA Gives Indiana Three Years of Probation, No Penalties, USA TODAY, Nov. 26, 2008,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/bigten/2008-11-25-indiana-
penaltiesN.htm.
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tions as sufficient punishment for the violations.37 The Committee also
looked at the decimation of the program as a result of these violations
and fifty years of near perfect compliance by the University as mitigat-
ing factors.38 To the surprise of Indiana officials, the Committee did in
fact find the University guilty of the failure to monitor charge despite
their numerous efforts to refute liability. 39 The Committee found that
the monitoring of the basketball program and Sampson was not ready
and operational at the time Sampson was hired.40 Specifically, the
NCAA found that the compliance effort of the school was inadequate
due to the heightened concern given Sampson's previous history of
similar violations.41 In support of Indiana's compliance efforts, the
Committee did acknowledge that Sampson's conduct was unprece-
dented in that he not only ignored signed compliance agreements with
the University, but he also ignored telephone penalties imposed by
the NCAA. 42 A further ramification of this ruling by the Infractions
Committee seems to be its adoption of a new standard.43 Big Ten
Commissioner Jim Delany took the Committee's finding to imply that
"when you hire someone who had serious problems at an institution,
you're almost strictly liable for their actions going forward. The Com-
mittee is adopting a strict liability standard." 44 While sparing Indiana
University any further punishment, the infractions report handed
down by the NCAA will have ongoing ramifications as Universities
monitor their coaching staff's and as they look to hire new coaches,
especially coaches with a checkered past.
E. Indiana Moves On
The rebuilding process is underway in Bloomington and Tom Crean
knows he has his work cut out for him. In the 2008-2009 season, Crean
guided his team to a 6-25 record. 45 The team consisted of eight fresh-
man and only three players taller than 6-foot-6. 46 Even amid the re-
cent scandal and uncertainty surrounding the program Crean has been
able to secure what is considered one of the nation's top incoming
37. Id.
38. Committee, supra note 34.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Committee Punishes IU, supra note 35.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Big Ten Conference Basketball Standings, ESPN, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/
ncb/conferences/standings?confld=7 (last visited September 25, 2009).
46. Marot, supra note 1.
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recruiting classes for the 2009-2010 season. 4 7 It will be years before
one will be able to look back on this scandal and effectively evaluate
the long-term effects the scandal had on Indiana's basketball program
and Institution as a whole.
While this might seem like an open and shut case, the Indiana situa-
tion is just one example of similar problems occurring at NCAA insti-
tutions nationwide. For one, should institutions actually be punished
for actions of individual coaches or coaching staffs for which they had
no part or influence in? If so, what theories justify holding a university
liable for the actions of a few, specific individuals? Not only does the
decision to punish the school effect the institution, it also affects the
student-athletes and the incoming coaching staffs. Many of these stu-
dent-athletes lives are altered as they are forced to transfer to new
schools and the incoming coaching staff is forced to work under a situ-
ation that was created by actions of a previous staff. In this situation
alone, all but two of the players making up the Indiana roster under
Sampson left the school just months after the allegations surfaced and
new coach, Tom Crean, was forced to deal with stringent recruiting
limitations.4 8 In determining if the school itself, the future coaches and
players should be forced to bear the punishment for others actions, it
is important to look at the effects of these strict penalties. Does the
punishment have a deterrent effect on coaches and institutions going
forward? Is the situation different where an institution hires a person
with a questionable track record? Should that institution be held to a
strict liability standard? In all, the aim of this article is to evaluate the
Infraction Committee's decision in this case and decide if it is the best
solution to apply to deter future transgressions, to help better the spe-
cific institutions in the long-run, and at the same time to remain fair to
those individuals who will be affected by the punishment.
III. NCAA RULES AND PREVIOUS PRECEDENT
A. Generally
The NCAA Rules and Bylaws govern not only the NCAA itself, but
also the member institutions and the student-athletes at those institu-
tions. These Bylaws govern the Infractions Committee as it considers
what findings and penalties to hand down in each specific case. The
pertinent provisions in the following cases come from "The Principle
47. Committee Punishes 1U, supra note 35.
48. Marot, supra note 3.
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of Rules Compliance" or Bylaw 2.8.49 The three subparts discuss the
responsibility of the institution, the responsibility of the NCAA and
the penalty for non-compliance with the Bylaws.50 Section 2.8.1 states
that "[ejach institution shall comply with all applicable rules and regu-
lations of the Association in the conduct of its intercollegiate athletic
programs," and that all staff, student-athletes and other people who
represent the institutions athletic interests are to comply with all
NCAA rules and the institution is responsible for such compliance.51
The NCAA, on the other hand, is to afford all the member institu-
tions, their staff's and their student-athlete's fair procedures in evalu-
ating an alleged violation of compliance. 52 The penalties for such non-
compliance are subject to "such disciplinary and corrective actions as
may be determined by the Association."5 3
A quick look at these specific sections of the NCAA's Bylaws seems
to establish the basis of the liability for institutions such as Indiana
University. In Indiana's situation, Sampson, as a member of one of its
coaching staffs, is an individual representing its athletics interests and;
therefore, Indiana is responsible for his compliance with the applica-
ble Association rules. Therefore, at first glance, the Bylaws of the
NCAA create sufficient grounds for the charges against Indiana in
this specific case. However, it requires a much deeper look into other
specific cases evaluated by the NCAA to evaluate if the NCAA's deci-
sion was fair and justified.
B. Infractions at Brigham Young University
On March 11th, 2008 the NCAA released its public infractions re-
port against Brigham Young University (BYU). 54 The infraction was
due to a violation of recruiting legislation specifically related to the
treatment of a Cuban defector, who BYU was recruiting for its men's
volleyball team. In the summer of 2005, a mother of a student-athlete
at BYU gave financial assistance to the prospective student-athlete.55
In December of the same year, the school determined that the pros-
49. NCAA Division I Rules and Bylaws §2.8, http://www.ncaapublications.comfUploads/PDF/
Division_1_Manual_2008-09e9e568al-c269-4423-9ca5-16d6827cl6bc.pdf (last visited September
25, 2009).
50. Id.
51. Id. at § 2.8.1.
52. Id. at § 2.8.2.
53. Id. at § 2.8.3.
54. NCAA Major Infraction Case Search, https://webl.ncaa.org/LSDBilexec/miSearch (search
"Institution" for "Brigham Young University"; then follow "Violation of NCAA legislation in
the men's volleyball. . ." hyperlink) [hereinafter BYU Case].
55. Id.
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pect was ineligible because of the loan and other benefits received by
the recruit.56 BYU in turn, self-reported the violations to the NCAA
and a hearing was setup to evaluate the allegations against the
institution.
At the hearing in front of the Infractions Committee, BYU's Presi-
dent stated that BYU "know[s] that the institution is responsible for
the acts of its employees and supporters who may intentionally or un-
intentionally violate NCAA rules, and [BYU] ha[s] acknowledged in-
stitutional responsibility for the resulting infractions."5 7 The
Committee upheld a failure to monitor charge against both the head
coach at the time of the infraction and against BYU.58 The Committee
found a sufficient basis for the failure to monitor charge against the
institution due to the fact that the school had known the recruit was
on campus and had even given cautionary instructions to the coaching
staff about the recruit. With this knowledge BYU then failed to fol-
low-up in any manner to ensure that the school had complied with
NCAA rules.59 The Committee added three years of probation and a
public reprimand to BYU's self-imposed penalties of a reduction in
scholarships and recruiting limits on the program.60
When comparing the situation at BYU to the case at Indiana it
seems surprising that the NCAA came down the way it did. In both
cases the respective compliance departments were aware of a specific
potential for violations, be it a recruit living on campus or a coach
with a history of violating the rules. In BYU's case, its failure to fol-
low-up on a high risk situation led to its failure to monitor charge
while Indiana's failure to monitor charge resulted from its failure to
monitor Sampson close enough. In the end both programs were
handed similar penalties in the form of their self-imposed reduction of
scholarships and recruiting limits as well as the NCAA's three year
probation and public reprimand. It is hard to believe both programs
were given the same punishment based on the Committee's rationale
in the BYU case. In that case, the Committee felt the coach should
have been more alert to the possibility of violations due to his experi-
ence as a coach and his training. Along a similar line of reasoning,
should Indiana not be held to a higher standard due to the past history
of the coach it hired and his past issue with the same exact impermissi-
ble phone calls? It seems it would be hardly just if two men's basket-
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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ball programs were punished the same when one institution hired a
known cheater as its coach and the other program had instead opted
for the rule-abiding coach and both turned out to be cheaters. Is the
former not more culpable because it knowingly hired this individual
with the bad track record, making his transgressions more foresee-
able? This analysis will be conducted more in depth below using the
legal theories of negligent hiring and strict liability.
C. Infractions at the University of Oklahoma
On May 25th, 2006 the NCAA released a public infractions report
against the University of Oklahoma. 61 The infractions occurred from
2000 to 2004 when Kelvin Sampson was the head men's basketball
coach at the University.62 The violations consisted of 577 impermissi-
ble telephone calls to seventeen recruits over the four year period. 63
The Infractions Committee characterized Sampson's actions as a com-
plete disregard for NCAA rules regarding telephone contact limita-
tions.M Rather than accept responsibility, Sampson deemed the calls
hard work as opposed to cheating.65 These violations occurred while
Sampson was the President of the National Association of Basketball
Coaches (NABC), a group which had identified impermissible calls as
a serious issue in recruiting violations.66 Sampson and his staff were
able to get away with the calls by purposefully failing to record all the
calls on call logs as Oklahoma's procedures required.67 The violations
led to failure to monitor charges against both Sampson and the
University. 68
The Committee found the charge against Sampson justified because
he "created an environment in which telephone contact rules were
consciously ignored." 69 This blatant disregard for the rules was
demonstrated after an opposing coach notified Sampson that one of
his assistant's was violating the call rules and Sampson rather than
report the violation or do anything to change the behavior, instead
encouraged it in the name of hard work.70 The Committee also found
61. NCAA Major Infraction Case Search, https://webl.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/miSearch (search
"Institution" for "University of Oklahoma"; then follow "Violations of NCAA legislation gov-
erning impermissible telephone contacts. . ." hyperlink) [hereinafter Oklahoma case].
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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the charge against Oklahoma to be justified. The Committee found
that the institution failed to put in place sufficient rules to ensure the
staff was in compliance with the telephone rules and the system to
track and monitor calls was insufficient because there was no set sys-
tem to track the calls or spot check to ensure the actual bills matched
up with the log sheets that were completed by the staff.7 1 In support of
these findings, the Committee found the 500 impermissible calls in
four years to be sufficient evidence that the system was inadequate. 72
On top of that, the review of the records was sporadic and the coaches
were taken at their word, even when a minor review of the call logs
and bills would have shown the impermissible calls.73 The Committee
charged the University with a failure to monitor charge as opposed to
a lack of institutional control charge because the infractions entailed
only one aspect of one sport.74 In all, the Committee found that the
system currently in place was insufficient to monitor the actions of the
basketball program. 5 As a result of its findings, the Committee ap-
proved the self-imposed scholarship reduction and recruiting limita-
tions while also imposing a public reprimand and two year probation
on the institute.76
In comparing this decision with the decision in the Indiana case, it
seems the Committee was very fair to Indiana. In the Oklahoma case
the 500 calls over four years alone was sufficient to demonstrate the
compliance system was inadequate. Therefore, the 100 impermissible
calls in just one year at Indiana also seems to be a fair indicator that
its compliance system was inadequate and that a failure to monitor
charge was justified. The only difference in the punishments was the
additional year given to Indiana. Should there have been a stiffer pen-
alty because Indiana took that risk and hired Sampson, the coach who
made the 500 impermissible calls at Oklahoma? The infractions report
describes Sampson as consciously disregarding a rule he knew very
well as President of the NABC. 77 He also continued to disregard the
rule after being notified by other coaches that his assistants were un-
dertaking these rules violations. What made Indiana think he would
change his ways? Should it be held to a higher standard and more
culpable for making a questionable hiring? Indiana's response is that
it did in fact impose higher standards in that it reviewed 100% of the
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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staff's calls, but that due to the false reporting it could not look at
them all. While that is a valid argument, Indiana was on notice of this
type of behavior and it does not seem to be entirely unfair or unjusti-
fied that it should be held more culpable for enabling Sampson to
continue his unethical pattern; thus, making the additional year of
probation justified.
D. Infractions at Middle Tennessee State
On May 22nd, 2008, the NCAA released the public infractions re-
port against Middle Tennessee State women's volleyball program.78
The student-athlete had played professionally and told a graduate as-
sistant of the program that she also had been paid.79 At some point
the head coach learned of the athlete playing professionally overseas
and at no point did the coach notify the institute or its compliance
office.80 In one specific instance, the coach instructed the student-ath-
lete to not mention that she had been paid to play overseas on her
"international student-athlete form."81 The Infractions Committee
found inadequate oversight by Middle Tennessee State's compliance
staff to the coach and the volleyball program. 82 The Committee found
the failure to monitor justified even though the coach kept informa-
tion from the compliance office because other clues, such as the ath-
lete's old age and four year gap in activities should have led the
institute to investigate the athlete's eligibility status.83
In this case, Middle Tennessee State was given a public reprimand,
two years of probation, forced to vacate all wins the athlete partici-
pated in and forced to reduce the amount of scholarships given out by
the volleyball program. 84
While the specific violations of this case are not similar to the Indi-
ana situation, both cases involve a coach's conscious disregard for an
NCAA rule of which they had knowledge; hence, the two situations
are analogous. In the Middle Tennessee State case, the NCAA seems
to impose a higher duty on the University due to the suspicious his-
tory of the student-athlete.85 This seems comparable to the heightened
78. NCAA Major Infraction Case Search, https://webl.ncaa.org/LSDBilexec/miSearch (search
"Institution" for "Middle Tennessee State University"; then follow "Violations in the women's
volleyball program. . ." hyperlink) [hereinafter Middle Tenn. Case].
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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duty that the Committee cited Indiana owed due to Sampson's past
history and the likelihood he would act unethically again. In this case,
the Infractions Committee also seems to hold that advising or warning
by the compliance office is not sufficient, but rather the office needs to
investigate further and follow-up on potential violations. Applying
this rationale to the Indiana situation, it seems fair that Indiana be
held to a higher duty due to Sampson's history. Were there clues simi-
lar to those in the Middle Tennessee State case that Indiana should
have noticed causing a more thorough investigation? The compliance
agreements that Sampson signed are comparable to the warning given
by the compliance office in this case in that that alone does not end
the job of the compliance office, they are to go deeper and investigate
and ensure that a violation did not or does not occur.
E. Infractions at Chicago State University
On December 18th, 2003, the NCAA Infractions Committee re-
leased the public infractions report against the Chicago State Univer-
sity women's basketball program.86 The Institution self-reported
numerous NCAA violations in the program and at the time of the
self-reporting the head coach was already under a show-cause provi-
sion resulting from her involvement in violations of NCAA legislation
at a previous institution.87 The show-cause provision required the
head coach to be absent from certain preseason practices, but the
coach seemingly ignored the requirements.88 Other violations in the
self-report were similar to violations that the head coach was involved
with at her previous institution. 89
The Infractions Committee considered charging Chicago State with
a lack of institutional control because some of the violations were sim-
ilar to those in which the head coach was involved with at her previous
job, but the Committee decided against it for numerous reasons. 90 For
starters, the Committee felt that if someone has their mind set on
something it is extremely hard, if not impossible, to stop them. "Any
system designed to provide institutional control, no matter how well
conceived, organized, and implemented, can be undermined for a pe-
riod of time by an individual determined to violate NCAA rules."91
86. NCAA Major Infraction Case Search, https://webl.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/miSearch (search
"Institution" for "Chicago State University"; then follow "Violations of playing and practice
season; recruiting violations. . ." hyperlink) [hereinafter Chicago State Case].
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
85
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Another factor in deciding against the charge was the Committee's
belief that it cannot interfere with an institutions right to make their
own individual staffing decisions. However, the Committee did an-
nounce that in its eyes the best safeguard is to retain only staff mem-
bers who have the utmost integrity and even went on to say that
"[s]taffing decisions, particularly those undertaken with notice of past
problems, are relevant to a determination of institutional control." 92
Fortunately for Chicago State, the institute had employed the coach
prior to her being named in the previous case and; therefore, the insti-
tute was not on notice of her past issues.93 The final reason why a lack
of institutional control was not given was because of the numerous
mitigating factors in this specific situation.94 These factors include the
Institute's cooperation in the investigation, its self-imposed penalties
and corrective actions, the lack of a failure to monitor charge against
the school and the fact that no coaches who were part of this dilemma
were still at the school.95 As a result of its findings, the Infractions
Committee imposed a public reprimand on the school and two years
of probation to go along with its self-imposed penalties.96
In comparing this case to the Indiana situation, it again seems Indi-
ana's penalties were fair. This situation is very similar to that which
occurred in Indiana's case as evidenced by the school citing this case
in its response to the NCAA. 97 While the cases involve different types
of violations, both involved a coach committing violations that he or
she had committed previously at a different institution. However, in
Indiana's case it knew of the pending case against Sampson, while
Chicago State had no notice of the case or allegations against its coach
until after it had hired and worked with her for a year.98 This knowl-
edge of the previous violations seems to differentiate the two cases.
Between these two situations, it seems fairly evident that Indiana
would be the more culpable party due to its knowledge when it made
the hiring.
Indiana seems to have dodged a bullet in that the NCAA did not
levy a lack of institutional control charge against it. The Committee
refrained from charging Chicago State with it because at the time its
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Michael Marot, Indiana Braces for Possibility of More Penalties, Ass. PRESS, Sept. 30,
2008, available at http://btn20l.americaneagle.com/news/article.asp?listid=22&story-id=317131
5&FPG=45.
98. Chicago State Case, supra note 86.
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hiring was a competent decision as mentioned above. It could be ar-
gued that Indiana's decision was not very competent. In the past the
Committee has said that staffing decisions are very pertinent to a find-
ing of lack of institutional control and; therefore, the Committee
would not have been going against precedent in finding Indiana guilty
of such a charge. In the Oklahoma case mentioned previously, the
Committee found a failure to monitor charge was more fitting because
the violation only affected one aspect of one sport, so seemingly the
Committee would have had to find a way to justify expanding the vio-
lation to a lack of institutional control to a similar situation.99 The
egregious nature of Sampson's acts and the extremely questionable
nature of the hire could have been cited as justifications for expanding
the lack of institutional control charge.
The mitigating factors cited by the Committee seem to be evident in
both cases. Both cases involved the utmost cooperation by the liable
institutes and the self-imposed penalties and corrective actions were
found to be sufficient at both schools. However, where Chicago State
was not cited for a failure to monitor charge, Indiana was, and; there-
fore, it seems that factor operates as justification for a lack of institu-
tional control charge. At Indiana, just as with Chicago State, all the
coaches involved in the scandal are gone.
The penalties in the two cases are also similar with Indiana receiv-
ing just one extra year of probation. Without arguing for or against
charging Indiana with a lack of institutional control it is easy to see
how the argument could be made on both sides of the issue based on
the various similarities and differences between the two cases. At the
very least, it is evident Indiana was lucky to just be charged with a
failure to monitor charge and not the lack of institutional control
charge that could have likely been justified by NCAA officials.
IV. APPLYING LEGAL DOCTRINES TO THE INDIANA CASE
While the NCAA and its institutions are not under the jurisdiction
of America's system of courts when it pertains to these recruiting vio-
lations, the legal doctrines used daily in courtrooms across the country
can be used to assess the fairness of holding an institution liable for
the independent actions of coaches within its athletic programs.
A. Respondeat Superior Liability
In response to the failure to monitor charge, Indiana claimed the
"impermissible calls are a reflection on the veracity of the coaches in
99. Oklahoma Case, supra note 61.
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question, not the strength of the monitoring system for recruiting
calls." 00 The NCAA continually penalizes institutions for the inde-
pendent actions of their coaches. Is this a fair practice? The first legal
doctrine that can be used to justify and evaluate the NCAA's punish-
ment of these institutions is respondeat superior liability. To evaluate
this doctrine, this article will analyze the doctrine generally and then
expand on that analysis with two specific cases.
1. Generally
Respondeat Superior imposes vicarious liability on an employer for
the tortious acts of an employee in the transaction of the employer's
business. 01 One rationale for this liability is to ensure that the enter-
prise or business pays for the victim's injuries because it has the right
to control the employee's conduct.102 This liability only applies when
the culpable employee is acting within the scope of his or her employ-
ment.103 When determining if an employee was acting within the
scope of employment a court is to consider if the acts were: foresee-
able, done in furtherance of the business, directly or indirectly con-
nected to the business, partly motivated by an intention to serve the
employer and expectable in view of the employer's duties.104 Acts that
are performed in a "forbidden method" or in conflict with employer's
instructions can still be found to be within the scope of employment so
long as the employee was acting "in part to serve the employer's
purposes." 05
Applying these rules, it seems that if a plaintiff would be able to
demonstrate some sort of injury against Indiana, the University would
be liable for the damages under respondeat superior. Indiana's ability
to control Sampson and his staff provide the underlying rationale for
applying this doctrine.
The crucial issue seems to be whether Sampson was acting within
the scope of employment when he made the impermissible calls. All
the factors mentioned above seem to establish that the calls could be
deemed to have been within the scope of employment. Based on
Sampson's past violations at Okalahoma, the impermissible calls were
highly foreseeable and in turn expectable given Sampson's duties to
recruit the best players to Indiana to improve its basketball program.
100. Marot, supra note 3.
101. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Employment Relationships § 373 (2008)
102. Id. at § 374.
103. Id. at § 373.
104. Id. at § 379.
105. Id. at § 380.
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The calls also seem to have been done in furtherance of the basketball
program and Indiana because these calls are intended to land better
recruits, which not only increases Sampson's prestige as a coach but
will also lead to more wins for the basketball program. These wins will
create more publicity for the program and generate more revenue for
the University. As a result, the calls not only further the business of
Indiana University, but they are also directly related to the Univer-
sity's success. It may be argued that Sampson is motivated solely by
personal prestige and success. However, Sampson benefits from Indi-
ana's success on the court and at the cash register because it likely
means more incentives for him. As long as Sampson's motivation in
making the calls was at least partially motivated to help Indiana's bot-
tom line, they can be found to be within the scope of employment. It
follows that although Sampson's calls may have been a "forbidden
method" or in conflict with Indiana's instructions for achieving suc-
cess, under the respondeat superior doctrine, as long as the calls were
partly motivated to serve Indiana's purposes, Indiana will be vicari-
ously liable for his actions.
2. Specific Cases
While the fact situations in the following cases involve much more
serious events, the legal analysis provided is helpful in analyzing the
Indiana situation.
In Gambling v. Cornish, two off-duty Chicago cops asked the plain-
tiff on a date and when she refused, the cops grabbed her and drove
her to a beach, where she was raped. 0 6 The City of Chicago, as a
defendant, argued that it could not be liable for the outrageous acts of
its employees.10 7 In deciding the case, the Court turned to Illinois' law
of respondeat superior liability. 08 Under Illinois law, employers are
liable for the malicious acts of their employees when the acts are un-
dertaken within the scope of employment and in an attempt to further
the business of the employer.109 However, when an act is committed
solely for personal benefit of the employee, the employer is not lia-
ble. 110 Under § 245 of the Restatement of Agency, a master is liable
for acts done by a servant even if the act was unauthorized, as long as
the act was not unexpectable in view of the duties of the servant."
106. Gambling v. Cornish, 426 F. Supp. 1153, 1154 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1154-5.
111. Id. at 1155.
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While an act done solely for personal reasons prevents the application
of this doctrine, an act done only partially for personal gain does not
bar the application.l12 In applying these rules, the court held that the
off-duty cops were not acting within their scope of employment at the
time of the alleged acts." 3 For one, their conduct was too outrageous
for it to be considered expectable.11 4 On top of that, the acts of the
officers had no intent to further the City's interest, but were moti-
vated solely by a desire to gratify their personal interests.115
In applying this case to Indiana's situation it is easy to see that
Sampson's acts are far less egregious than those cited in the Gambling
case. However, the principles can still be applied to determine if
Sampson's impermissible calls would make Indiana liable as his em-
ployer under the respondeat superior doctrine. Under Illinois law, as
expressed in Gambling, Indiana would be liable for the malicious acts
of Kelvin Sampson, as its employee, if such acts were committed dur-
ing the course of his employment as head coach and done to benefit
Indiana's interests.
Sampson's intentional violation of the telephone contact limits
seems to fit the malicious act requirement. Black's Law Dictionary
defines malice as an intent to commit a wrongful act. 116 Sampson cer-
tainly had the intent to commit a wrongful act which in this case was
knowingly violating telephone contact limits on a regular basis.
The major hurdles in establishing this claim against Indiana would
be demonstrating that Sampson's calls were in the course or scope of
his employment and done for the benefit of Indiana University. Indi-
ana will attempt to argue that Sampson's acts were for his sole benefit
and; therefore, it is not liable, but it could easily be argued that his
actions were only partially personally motivated as they also were in-
tended to improve Indiana's basketball team and in turn increase rev-
enues for Indiana. As mentioned above, if one's personal motive is
only part of his or hers motivation the respondeat superior doctrine
can still be applied and; therefore, could still likely be used against
Indiana.117 Indiana may also argue that Sampson's acts were not
within his duties in that it did not want him to cheat or undertake
recruiting in the outrageous manner that he did. However, using § 245
as cited in Gambling, if an unauthorized act was not unexpectable
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. BLACK LAw DIcTIONARY 976 (8th ed. 2004).
117. Gambling, 426 F. Supp. at 1155.
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than the employer is still liable. In Indiana's case, while it did not au-
thorize Sampson to make impermissible calls, him doing so was cer-
tainly foreseeable due to his previous violations. Applying all of the
rules announced in Gambling, it seems that the theory of respondeat
superior would be a sufficient legal justification to hold Indiana liable
for the acts of Kelvin Sampson.
An additional look at this doctrine is provided by evaluating Indi-
ana's situation with Patterson v. Blair."8 The case involved an em-
ployee of the defendant company shooting the tires of plaintiff's
vehicle in an attempt to repossess the car for the company.119 Under
Kentucky law, an employer is not liable unless the acts of the em-
ployee were calculated to advance the cause of the employer.120 The
courts in Kentucky focus on the motive of the employee to determine
if he or she was acting within the scope of his or hers employment. 121
The court claims this doctrine is justified because it gives "employers
an incentive to hire only careful employees."1 22 In the end, the court
found the defendant company liable because the employee was acting
to further their business interests by trying to get the car back.123
Again this case presents a drastically different situation than that
which was present at Indiana, but this case just goes to show that even
outrageous conduct, be it shooting the tires of a car or intentionally
violating a known rule over 100 times can be held against an em-
ployer. The big issue under this case is determining whether Samp-
son's actions were in fact "calculated to advance the cause of the
principal." It seems likely that his actions would be found to be calcu-
lated to help Indiana because these excessive calls help him recruit
better, which not only makes him a better coach but also makes Indi-
ana's basketball team better. This better basketball team in turn gen-
erates more publicity and revenue for the school and; therefore, it
could be argued that Sampson's actions were calculated to help Indi-
ana. As a result, a Kentucky court is likely to pin liability on Indiana
based on the above analysis.
B. Negligent Hiring
A second legal theory that could be used to justify the holding of
institutions liable for the actions of their coaching staff's is the negli-
118. Patterson v. Blair, 172 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. 2005).
119. Id. at 363.
120. Id. at 368.
121. Id. at 369.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 372.
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gent hiring doctrine. This doctrine is especially applicable to Indiana's
situation.
1. Generally
Under the negligent hiring doctrine, employers are held directly lia-
ble for their hiring of incompetent, or unsuitable employees who in-
jure third parties by their tortious acts. 1 2 4 Recovery is predicated on
the plaintiff's ability to show that the employer should have known
that its employee's conduct would create an unreasonable risk of
harm.125
This theory differs from respondeat superior liability in a few ways.
For one, it is not the employee's acts that establish the cause of action,
but rather the employer's negligent hiring that proximately causes an
injury.126 Also, negligent hiring does not require that the employee be
acting within the scope of employment when the injuries to the plain-
tiff occurred as respondeat superior does. 127
In Indiana's situation, it appears that a plaintiff who is able to
demonstrate some form of an injury would be able to succeed under a
negligent hiring cause of action as long as it could establish all the
required elements in the specific jurisdiction.
2. Examples of Specific Elements Required
a. State of Ohio
In Hout v. City of Mansfield, an Ohio District Court specifically lays
out the five elements of a negligent hiring claim: (1) the existence of
an employment relationship; (2) the employee's incompetence; (3) the
employer's actual or constructive knowledge of such incompetence;
(4) the employee's act caused the plaintiff's injuries; and (5) the em-
ployer's negligence in hiring the employee was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries.128 The liability of the employer is determined
by the foreseeability of the employee's act.129
Was Indiana negligent in its hiring of Kelvin Sampson? Using the
elements espoused in Hout, an evaluation of the argument on both
sides can be conducted. The first element is satisfied because everyone
will agree that there was an employment relationship between Samp-
son and Indiana University for him to coach the men's basketball
124. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Employment Relationship § 389 (2008).
125. Id.
126. Id. at § 390.
127. Id. at § 391.
128. Hout v. City of Mansfield, 550 F. Supp. 2d 701, 755 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
129. Id.
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team. As for the second element, Black's Law Dictionary defines in-
competence as a "state or fact of being unable or unqualified to do
something."130 The liability of Indiana for a negligent hiring would
turn on how a court would decide this element. Did his past transgres-
sions make him unable to follow the recruiting rules? Judging by his
blatant violation of the rules at Oklahoma the argument could be
made that he is unable to follow the NCAA's rules, specifically those
pertaining to telephone contacts, and; therefore, he could be unquali-
fied to work at an NCAA institution. It seems like it might be a
stretch to make this argument due to his past coaching success, but
nonetheless it is not inconceivable that a court or governing body
could be swayed due to Sampson past transgressions.
Assuming Sampson is found to be incompetent, Indiana's knowl-
edge of this incompetence was evident from the day it announced his
hiring. Indiana's president Adam Herbert stated that Sampson's viola-
tions were a big concern, but that the University had reviewed them
and was satisfied that Sampson could run its program.131 Therefore,
element three is easily satisfied. Moving to element four, the plaintiff
in the specific case would have to prove that Sampson's actions caused
some injury to them. Some of the injured parties from this action are
the University, due to the public image hit, the basketball program
that is decimated for years to come and the players who had their lives
altered as a result of the massive housecleaning project that occurred
after the allegations surfaced. Assuming one of these parties demon-
strated an injury, the court would then move onto the fifth element,
proximate causation. On the surface it seems logical that but for Indi-
ana hiring Sampson, these violations would not have occurred when
and how they did. The similarity between the violations at both
Oklahoma and Indiana increase the support for the position that
Sampson's hiring was the proximate cause of the recruiting violations.
Since Sampson had done this before, Indiana's hiring of him enabled
him to do it again.
In all, it seems that if a party could prove (1) that Sampson was
incompetent to hold the heading coaching position and (2) that they
suffered an injury as a result of his hiring they could successfully bring
a cause of action in Ohio against Indiana under Hout for their negli-
gent hiring.
130. BLACK LAw DICrIONARY 780 (8th ed. 2004).
131. Indiana Hires Sampson To Replace Davis, ESPN, Mar. 29, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.
com/ncb/news/story?id=2389192.
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b. State of Texas
In Dangerfield v. Ormsby, a Texas appellate court applied a three
prong test to determine if an employer was liable for a negligent hir-
ing.132 The court held that an employer is liable if it: (1) hires an in-
competent or unfit employee, (2) that it knows was incompetent or
unfit, and (3) who proximately causes the injury to the injured
party.133 The court went on to hold that where there is nothing in an
employee's background that would cause him or her not to be hired
by a reasonable employer the employer was not negligent.134
Applying the guidelines set forth by the Texas court, it seems that
the first prong is easily satisfied. Indiana knowingly hired an incompe-
tent employee as explained above. The second prong will depend on
how much Indiana knew about what went on at Oklahoma. Did it
know he encouraged the violations and called it hard work and not
cheating? If yes, then this prong is met because a reasonable employer
with that knowledge is not likely to hire the individual. However, if it
did not know all the details, many employers would probably take a
chance given Sampson's past success as a coach. As for the causation
element, that is also the same as above, in that it seems Indiana did
cause the injury by allowing Sampson to make this impermissible calls
by giving him the employment opportunity to do so.
As with respondeat superior, it seems likely that Indiana could be
liable for the negligent hiring of Sampson as long as a plaintiff could
come forward and demonstrate some form of actionable injury.
C. Strict Liability
"Their point was when you hire someone who had serious problems
at an institution, you're almost strictly liable for their actions going
forward."135 That was commissioner Jim Delany's response to the
finding of Indiana guilty for failure to monitor its men's basketball
program after hiring Kelvin Sampson.136 What exactly is strict liability
and should it be imposed in situations such as this where a school hires
someone with a checkered past?
Strict liability is liability based solely on an action being undertaken
but not due to any fault of the person or entity that is found liable.137
Put another way, strict liability "exists in the case of acts which, al-
132. Dangerfield v. Ormsby, 264 S.W.3d 904, 912 (Tex. App. 2008).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Committee Punishes IU, supra note 35.
136. Id.
137. 74 Am. JUR. 2D Torts § 12 (2008).
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though lawful, are so fraught with possibility of harm to others that
the law treats them as allowable only on the terms of insuring the
public against injury."138 Liability stems from the undertaking of an
intentional behavior that exposes the public to a high risk that it oth-
erwise would not be subject to.'3 9 The storage of explosives, products
liability cases and conducting of blasting operations are just some of
the examples of actions that invoke the doctrine of strict liability.140
Looking at the above examples, the application does not seem to fit
with the Indiana situation. However, in the NCAA's eyes, within its
small jurisdiction, the hiring of a coach who has previously violated its
rules can be seen as an action that exposes the institute, student-ath-
letes and fans to an abnormal risk of future infractions. Delany's view
on the Infraction Committee's report seems dead on. No matter how
close Indiana supervised Sampson it was on the hook for any of his
actions that violated NCAA rules because of the abnormal risk it
knowingly took when hiring him.
V. CONCLUSION
Did the NCAA Infractions Committee get Indiana's punishment
right? That answer will likely depend on who is evaluating the situa-
tion. Looking at the situation objectively, it seems the penalties were
fair. The penalties given to Indiana were in accordance with previous
penalties handed out by the Infractions Committee in similar situa-
tions. While some may argue that additional punishment may have
been warranted, it is important to remember that the penalties handed
down are not meant "to 'cripple' a team and should instead focus on
making the institutions better."I41 The penalties and the media humili-
ation Indiana suffered serve not only as a lesson to Indiana going for-
ward but also to every other NCAA institution in how they conduct
their athletic programs and hire their men and women to run their
programs. On the other hand, some may argue that no additional pen-
alties were necessary because it was unfair to hold the University for
liable when it did nothing wrong. However, a thorough look at the
NCAA's precedent as well as the legal theories of respondeat superior
liability and negligent hiring provide numerous justifications for hold-
ing Indiana responsible. In all, it seems that the punishment handed
down by the Infractions Committee was fair and legally defensible.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at § 13.
141. Marot, supra note 28.
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